

THE ROLE OF THE  
UNITED NATIONS SECRETARY GENERAL  
AS A MEDIATOR IN THE  
1974 CYPRUS CRISIS

A THESIS PRESENTED BY  
TÜLİN DALOĞLU  
TO  
THE INSTITUTE OF  
ECONOMICS AND SOCIAL SCIENCES  
IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE  
REQUIREMENTS  
FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF  
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

BILKENT UNIVERSITY  
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*tarafından başlatılmıştır*

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## ABSTRACT

This thesis examines the role of the UN Secretary General as a mediator in the 1974 Cyprus Crisis. The main point discussed in the thesis is that the UN Secretary General did not have the necessary leverage to put main driving terms of the two parties to the negotiation table to be discussed. This study depends on the "Conflict Analysis and Resolution" literature. The background of the 1974 Crisis is given and then evaluated in line with the adopted literature. The study is presented from the Turkish perspective. The result of the research shows that the lack of leverage of the Secretary General as a mediator prepared the ground for the termination of the conflict with the Turkish intervention to Cyprus. So, war provided a settlement of peace.

## ÖZET

Bu tez, 1974 Kıbrıs krizinde Birleşmiş Milletler Genel Sekreteri'nin arabuluculuk rolünü inceleme üzerine yapılmış bir çalışmadır. Tezde tartışılan başlıca konu, Birleşmiş Milletler Genel Sekreteri'nin, krize taraf partilerin, başlıca ayrı düştükleri konuları, müzakere masasında tartışmak üzere, konuları açmaya yeterli gücünün olmadığıdır. Çalışma "İhtilâf Analizi ve Çözümü" teorisine göre hazırlanmıştır. 1974 krizini hazırlayan sebebler verildikten sonra, sözü geçen teoriye göre kriz incelenmiştir. Çalışma Türkiye'nin bakış açısını esas alarak hazırlanmıştır. Çalışmada varılan sonuca göre BM Genel Sekreteri'nin arabuluculuk görevindeki yetersizliği, Türk tarafının Kıbrıs'a müdahalesi ile son bulmuştur. Böylece barışa giden yol, savaş ile sağlanmıştır.

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## CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION

From individuals' relationship to states' relationship the world has always witnessed conflicts and sometimes their resolution. So, one can not wonder why the "Conflict Analysis and Resolution" literature has gained a crucial place within international relations studies. This literature enables one to gain new perspectives to analyze conflicts. For this reason, Cyprus, which is a part of the international agenda for almost 32 years now, has been chosen as a case to focus on with the help of this literature.

The Cyprus conflict turned to be a crisis in 1974, when the Greek Junta took on the challenge. This study aims to elaborate the role of the United Nations Secretary General during the crisis period where he was appointed to conduct its "good-offices" mission.

The study depends on the "Conflict Analysis and Resolution" literature. However, the literature should be limited to a certain path to focus on the case. For that reason,

'mediation' and 'crisis' turned to be the key terms within this literature.

The 1974 Cyprus case was a crisis along the continuum of the overall conflict. In order to analyse the case, first, we need to know how to evaluate a crisis according to a certain track in the 'conflict analysis and resolution' literature. The same is also valid for the term mediator. As a result, the case can be examined referring to the data we obtain from the identification of these terms. Chapter II, therefore, provides a review of the literature concerning crisis management and intermediaries as a third party.

Chapter III aims at describing the background of the crisis. This would help the readers to understand the reasons why the parties turned the conflict to a crisis. After presenting a concise crisis situation prior to the conflict, the crisis is elaborated in itself. The Cyprus crisis is divided into four parts in order to understand its phases. These phases show the way as to how the crisis can be resolved, either in peace or in war. The case in consideration points out that the resolution

was reached with the "Peace Operation" of the Turkish side. That means the settlement was reached by means of a war, when it is considered from the Turkish side's point of view.

However, the thesis aims to elaborate the role of the United Nations Secretary General as a mediator during the crisis period. Simply to say, the task of the UN Secretary General's role was to try every means to re-establish the broken communication between the parties to the conflict on the Cyprus issue, and to lead them to reach a settlement on the negotiation tables. The Secretary General is appointed to play his peace-providing task at times of a conflict basing on his legal right as stated in the UN Charter. Article 1 of the Charter says that;

maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace. (1)

To repeat once more, in case of a breach of communication, a mediator has to establish individual communication links with each of the parties in order to ascertain the reasons behind their involvement in the conflict. Having established and defined these reasons, the mediator, then has to re-establish tri-lateral communication links between the parties in order to facilitate qualified concessions. These concessions can then lead to a resolution of the crisis acceptable by both sides. A successful mediator, who is good at timing, information, and leverage, can provide a good communication link between the adversaries. If the mediator is able to persuade the parties to negotiate and continue with this process, then one may expect qualified concessions acceptable to them and issued by each other. These concessions can then be the sources of peaceful and long lasting solution to their problem.

Finally, the last chapter tries to underline the results of the study.

## CHAPTER II. CRISIS AND MEDIATION IN THE "CONFLICT ANALYSIS AND RESOLUTION" LITERATURE

### 2.1 CRISIS MANAGEMENT

#### 2.1.1 CRISIS

The term 'crisis' took its place in the theoretical literature in the aftermath of the Cuban Missile crisis (1962) during which Mc Namara the US. Secretary of Defense, declared that "there is no longer any such thing as strategy, only crisis management." (1)

Several definitions of the term crisis have been made in the literature. Charles Hermann defines a crisis as a situation which should threaten the main interests of a state where the policy makers of the concerned state have a short time to formulate a policy and where there is an element of surprise. (2) Glenn H. Snyder and Paul Diesing, in their book Conflict Among Nations define crisis as,

a sequence of interactions between the governments of two or more sovereign states in severe conflict, short of actual war, but involving the perception of a dangerously high probability of war.(3)

Coral Bell traces the word "crisis" to its Greek derivation to mean simply a 'decision point' or 'turning point' of an illness.(4) For other analysts, the term denotes an event or situation that is confined within a much shorter period of time, and is measured in days or weeks rather than years. At the core of these definitions there are three common elements:

(a) A perception of threat to high-priority goals;

(b) A shortage of time in which to formulate responses;

(c) A high probability of an escalation in violence.

In fact, crises arise out of conflicts, but they are easier to study than conflicts as they can be isolated from normal interactions as opposed to conflicts. A crisis has a life cycle of its own. A crisis begins, grows, and then dies. Bell states in his study, The Conventions of Crisis that,

the essence of true crisis in any given relationship is that the conflicts within it rise to a level which threatens to transform the nature of the relationship... The concept is of normal strain rising to the level of breaking strain.(5)

So, crises lie at the crucial threshold between peace and war. The actors may transform with being first allies then becoming adversaries, or there may be relatively minimal changes in actors' relationship as a result. Young considers these possibilities. He defines crisis as;

a process of interaction occurring at higher levels of perceived intensity than the ordinary flow of events and characterized by: a sharp break from the ordinary flow of politics; a rise in the perceived prospects that violence will break out; and significant implications for the stability of some system or subsystem (or pattern of relationship) in international politics. (6)

#### 2.1.2 CRISIS MANAGEMENT

'Management' is defined as control in the Oxford Dictionary. Crisis management aims to control crises so that war does not break out through a series of participants'

miscalculations and mistakes. Phil Williams describes crisis management as follows:

crisis management is concerned on the one hand with the procedures for controlling and regulating a crisis so that it does not get out of hand and lead to war, and on the other with ensuring that the crisis is resolved on a satisfactory basis in which the vital interests of the state are secured and protected. The second aspect will almost invariably necessitate vigorous actions carrying substantial risks. One task of crisis management, therefore, is to temper these risks, to keep them as low and as controllable as possible, while the other is to ensure that the coercive diplomacy and risk-taking tactics are as effective as possible in gaining concessions from the adversary and maintaining one's own position relatively intact.(6)

In a crisis situation, each state therefore attempts to seek what is in its best interest. Each has certain goals or objectives which it strives to attain, and these goals and objectives contradict mostly with adversaries' interests. Joseph Bouchard interprets this situation as, "a crisis is fundamentally a bargaining relationship between the two sides".(7) Each party to the conflict, characterized by interdependence, forces the other to take into consideration others'



decisions, actions, and objectives when formulating its own policy. This action-reaction process between states entails a great degree of risk, because parties purposefully raise their own risk levels in order to reach their goals or objectives by the end of the crisis.

### 2.1.3 CRISIS STRUCTURE

To repeat, a crisis has a life-cycle. It begins, grows, and dies. Crisis is a phase along the continuum of a conflict. But it does not bring one to its management. It only shows that the conflict has reached a stalemate and it will be resolved either by war or with acceptable concessions by the parties to the conflict.

Crisis has a time scale in the overall conflict. The conflicting issues do not arise at once. The parties negotiate in order to reach a settlement of their dispute, and during these negotiations they bargain in a certain manner. A conflict turns out to be a crisis with the realization of a challenge. The challenge is motivated by a precipitant attempt. This attempt gives rise to a change;

it may concern national security, economic viability, territorial integrity or similar factors. This is then followed up to a resistance point. This resistance point stands for a situation where there is no more alternatives of bargaining. This is related to adversaries' ranges of bargaining. The parties reach a point where there would be no more concessions.(8) The resistance point is this point, and the conflict turns into a crisis. So, crises in general follow the confrontation process. In the complicated confrontation process, the negotiators try to maintain control over the events and risks associated with crisis. Bell argues that time pressures, stress, and lack of complete information available to decision makers during crisis situations make rational and calculated decisions difficult.(9) While this is true, the availability of recognizable tools or techniques enhances states' ability to cope and manage crisis situations. Brecher outlines a number of tools available to this end. These include, "verbal, political, economic, non-violent military and violent" ones.(10) The objective in the use of these tools is to communicate a message of resolve and commitment

to the adversary. Bell, using a different terminology, groups both verbal and non-verbal communiqués as 'signals'.(11) Examples of signals range from diplomacy to sanctions, the invoking of international law and the movement of one's military forces. These tools, a state chooses reflect the degree of state interest in the crisis at hand. Is the issue of vital strategic importance to the state in question? To what degree is it willing to go in order to secure or preserve its interests? Or is it an issue in which it is willing to make concessions? These are all questions decision makers face when they formulate a policy in response to a crisis situation.

The mainstream trend in the literature of crisis management views the avoidance of war as the ultimate goal. Yet, in many respects it is restrictive in nature, as it necessitates that both or all parties to crisis place a high value on the avoidance of war. But both going to war and reaching an agreement make up crisis management.

## 2.2 INTERMEDIARIES AS A THIRD PARTY

### 2.2.1. THE INTERMEDIARY

The theoretical base of the thesis is found in the literature concerning 'intervention of intermediaries'. Little attention has been paid to third parties as intermediaries, because modern theories of international relations have emerged in response to relations between superpowers and their competition for spheres of influence. Christopher Mitchell explains the term 'intermediaries' as

third parties that intervene diplomatically in a conflict by the consent of both parties with the intention of achieving some compromise settlement of the issues at stake between the parties, or at least ending disruptive conflict behavior indulged in by both sides.(12)

Intermediaries become strikingly active when the context is other than superpower relations. Today, small states, international organizations, and a variety of transnational actors regularly intervene in crises. They do not change the balance of power nor do they impose solutions, but they do intervene to change state affairs. What may be most distinguishing is that intermediaries must gain parties' acceptance or consent. Second,

influence by intermediaries, large or small, state or non-state, entails more subtle processes than the use of threat or force. It may involve offers of aid or simply the appropriation of decisions about negotiating procedures.(13)

### 2.2.2 NEGOTIATION BY AN INTERMEDIARY

An intermediary's intervention can be considered as one of the main forms of negotiation. Some negotiations are direct and bilateral. Others are multilateral where one member 'mediates' in the sense of bringing the others together to form a coalition. In such coalition bargaining, all parties in multilateral negotiations are potential mediators, but they are neither "in between" nor intermediaries.(14)

Briefly, intermediaries are actors with incentives to get involved, but without direct interests in the disputed issues. They may provide just enough incentives to settle the dispute or, to put it more subtly, just enough change in perceptions and attitudes to tip the balance from a contentious to a cooperative

approach to resolve the dispute. The difference they make is not so much between who wins and who loses or how much is gained and lost, rather, it is between settling early rather than late or between trying one more round at the negotiating table rather than initiating hostilities or between searching for the common denominators for negotiations rather than getting tied up with the preconditions of negotiations. When the settlement of a conflict moves between violent and peaceful, and when the settlement of a conflict moves from seemingly minor questions of procedure and saving face, intermediaries can push the parties toward conciliatory approaches sometimes gently and unobtrusively, sometimes with concrete inducements.

### 2.2.3 THE TYPES OF AN INTERMEDIARY INTEREST

The intermediary can be distinguished by examining the nature of its interests. Princen has identified two types of intermediaries depending on the nature of their interests. If the intermediary has no interest whatsoever in the disputed issues -direct or

indirect- but simply wants to facilitate an agreement, it is a "neutral mediator". If the intermediary has no direct interest in the issue but does have indirect interests, like security concerns in the region, it is a "principal mediator" and it also has the resources to bring to bear.(15)

United Nations, which is the focus of this study, by being an intermediary party to resolve the conflict of Cyprus, is a "principal mediator". The organization's major purposes are stated in Article 1 of the United Nations Charter as follows:

To maintain international peace and security... and to bring about by peaceful means and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace." (16)

Chapter VI, regarding "The Pacific Settlement of Disputes", obligates the parties to a conflict or dispute "likely to endanger... international peace and security" to submit it to some procedure for pacific settlement, whether negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to some regional agency, or any other method the parties can devise. (17)

#### 2.2.4 PRINCIPAL MEDIATOR

For the principal mediator, the main concern of intervention is the payoff structure and the intervention objective is to enhance incentives for agreement. A principal mediator bargains with each disputant on the issues in which it has indirect interests, that is, indirect to the disputant's originally disputed issues. At least three bargaining dynamics are possible: First, the mediator can bargain directly with a disputant to strike a side deal. Second, it can form a coalition with one disputant to compel a concession from the other disputant. Finally, it can create a three-way circular bargaining in which the mediator makes a deal with one disputant, who makes a deal with the mediator to complete the circle. One effect on the disputants is to expand agreement alternatives. In the end, the original dispute may be settled almost as a by-product of these various bargaining combinations.

#### 2.2.5 BARGAINING STRUCTURE OF A PRINCIPAL MEDIATOR

The principal mediator's intervention, fundamentally changes the bargaining dynamics



and structure. The bargaining is no longer direct and bilateral, but it is a three-way bargaining, because the mediator is primarily concerned with the dynamics of side deals, coalitions, and circular deal-making, whereby the disputants' bilateral negotiation becomes secondary. Of course, part of what is at stake in the two parallel bargaining with the mediator is the issues in dispute between the original disputants. However the focus of the bargaining, and the character of interaction, shifts from direct bilateral bargaining (between disputants) to parallel bilateral bargaining and circular three-way bargaining (among disputants and mediator). Much of the bargaining on the original dispute thus becomes indirect bargaining through the mediator. Therefore, one consequence of this kind of intervention is that it detracts from the disputants' direct interactions. (18)

#### 2.2.6 ACTIONS AND BARGAINING STRATEGY OF THE PRINCIPAL MEDIATOR

Mediator's role and tasks are extremely complex, and the mediator's initiatives and bargaining strategies vary greatly from case to

case. Intervention ranges from passing messages between the parties to active engagement in the bargaining and attempts to place pressure on the antagonists to accept peace proposals that the mediator has formulated. The activities of the third party may thus vary along several dimensions, such as formality-informality, extensiveness of resources committed, directness of penetration into bargaining, and the identity of the conflict. Young, first lists mediator's actions, taken to help the opponents begin or continue bilateral discussions, or to help implement any agreements already reached. Here, the intermediary does not become involved in the essential bargaining. The list includes 'good offices', 'data source', 'interposition', and 'supervision'. For the purposes of this study, 'good offices mission', which is the role that United Nations Secretary-General appointed to the Cyprus issue by the UN Security Council, will be discussed. Second, Young lists the bargaining strategies that a mediator adopts, which are: 'persuasion', 'enunciation', 'elaboration and initiation' and 'participation'. Again for our purposes, we shall discuss 'elaboration and initiation' as a

bargaining strategy. That is, one is for providing a good communication channel, then, for the continuation of this established communication. The aim of this strategy is to reach qualified concessions.

#### 2.2.7 BARGAINING RANGE

When the bargaining range, which is the set of agreement points that both sides prefer over their no-agreement alternatives is markedly skewed toward the more powerful disputant, the intermediary is inclined to rectify the imbalance and to propose a solution that is "fair". However, a fair solution from the perspective of the status quo is likely to be different from a fair solution from the perspective of reservation values, i.e. the values for which bargaining is impossible. If the intermediary chooses a status quo based on the fairness principle, the solution may, in fact, be less than the powerful side's reservation value. Fearing such a possibility, at least intuitively, the powerful disputant may resist an intervention altogether.

A fair solution suggested by an intermediary can thus thwart acceptance. The powerful disputant, aware of this dilemma, may try to convince the intermediary of its true reservation value that is the value of each party's no agreement alternative. In essence, the mediator tries especially to convert the bargaining structure from a win-lose position to a win-win position.

Acceptance may also be facilitated if the disputant chooses an intervenor with a demonstrated interest in simply getting an agreement, not necessarily one committed to getting a fair agreement. A high-profile intervenor, one in need of public success, may be better, in this case, for both disputant's and an equity -or efficiency- oriented intervenor.

## CHAPTER III. EVALUATION OF THE 1974 CYPRUS CRISIS

### 3.1 BACKGROUND TO THE 1974 CYPRUS CRISIS

The negotiations started between Turkey and Greece as a result of the failure of the Greek Government. The Greek side was unable to acquire a decision regarding one-sided self-determination right (meaning enosis) from the United Nations.

Turkey, certainly, was very decisive on giving support to Turkish Cypriots. The Turkish side was claiming equal communal rights for the two communities living on the island.

In February 1959, representatives of Turkey, Greece and the two Cypriot communities met with representatives of the British government in London. The British Government agreed to transfer the sovereignty of the island to the Turkish and Greek communities of Cyprus under partnership terms which these two ethnic communities, Turkey, and Greece had agreed upon.

The agreement made clear that there is no Cypriot nation and Cypriot Turks and Greeks had always lived and prospered as two independent ethnic communities; always jealously guarding their national and communal identity with separate languages, customs, culture, historical heritage and religion.(2) The compromise solution of the Zurich and London Agreements, was reached on the basis of a bi-national independence, resting on political equality and administrative partnership of the two communities, who were given full autonomy in what were strictly defined as communal affairs. The settlement thus established was to be guaranteed by Turkey, Greece, and Britain, thus ensuring the permanence of the Cyprus Republic and assuring both sides that peace would be maintained on the island.(3)

This framework has multiple dimensions. First, a Constitution proposed "functional federation". Second, a treaty of Guarantee guaranteed the situation caused by the articles of this treaty. Third, Treaty of Establishment left two sovereign military bases to England. And, fourth, Treaty of Alliance provided the existence of Greek and Turkish military

contingents on Cyprus. On August 16, 1960 the Cyprus Republic was officially established.

The arrangements of 1960 aimed at a domestic balance with a functional partnership between the two communities. The Constitution of the Cyprus Republic, established by the Treaty, was accepted through negotiations between the interested parties. In this respect, it was agreed not to have any changes in major principles. But by the collapse of the Constitution caused by the Greek Cypriot violation of constitutional measures, the "Treaty of Establishment" became invalid since 1960. Since then, the balance has been ensured through the guarantorship of Greece, Turkey, and England. Turkey, in this manner, put the whole island under guarantee including the English sovereign bases of Agratur and Dikelya. Greece had used its guarantorship right in a negative manner by pursuing 'Enosis'. Thus, England had visualized its guarantor right not as an obligation, but only as a right by staying silent in the face of the Greek Cypriot terrorism. In response to this, the Turkish side has provided peace and stability on the island determined by its right of guarantorship. Within this balance, it was

planned that Greece and Turkey will not reach an advantageous position over each other. In the light of this, for example, it was accepted in these years that, Cyprus could not be a member of the European Union unless Turkey becomes a member.

The Greek Cypriot side seemed to have no intention of allowing the resultant Constitution to persist. The campaign for Enosis was further intensified, and Greek Cypriot leader Makarios made no secret of his intention to amend the Constitution at any cost. Many of the 1960 Constitution principles that protected Turkish Cypriots' rights of partnership, were not being adopted. For example, the Turkish Cypriots were not employed at a rate of 30%. The appointments to foreign representations were not either made after reaching an agreement with the vice-president, who was Turkish. In addition, the EOKA members were allowed to attend both the Council of Ministers and public staff. The Cyprus army which would be composed of 20000 troops in which the Turkish Cypriots would participate at a rate of 40% was never established. The principles of the Constitution related to the different municipalities and the announcement



of this decision by Makarios was never realized. These can be counted as major examples.

Makarios claimed that the Zurich and London Agreements had given rights beyond a justifiable end to the Turkish Cypriots, and argued that the 1960 Constitution was not working any more. On 30 November 1963, Makarios confronted the Turkish wing of the Cyprus government with a proposal for thirteen amendments, which he must have known in advance would not be accepted. Seven out of these articles, were seeking the amendment of the unchangeable fundamental principles such as altering the 40-60 ratio in the Cypriot army. These amendments were rejected by the Turkish side on 16 December 1963.

On 21 December 1963, Archbishop Makarios authorized the formation of a militia to carry out a planned program of action known as the 'Akritas Plan'. As a result, 30000 Turkish Cypriots were forced to leave their villages which numbered 103. The entire population of the Turkish Cypriots were living within enclaves covering 3% of the island. The Turkish Cypriots, living within enclaves over the whole island, were suffering from the

economic blockade applied by the Greek Cypriots supported by foreign powers, and the violation of human rights by the Greek Cypriot militia. The arrival of the United Nations Peace Keeping Force on the island in the first half of 1964, did not change the situation. Greece secretly sent 20.000 troops to the island. This completely changed the structure of the Cyprus Republic; it turned to be a Greek Cypriot Republic rather than being a Republic based on Turkish-Greek Cypriot partnership. The two communities were separated.

These were given an end through a limited operation by Turkey in 1964. Turkey also started to give support for the establishment of Turk Mucahit Teskilati (TMT- Turkish counterpart of the EOKA) at that time and it also supported the Turkish Cypriot Government financially. The Turkish Cypriot villages of Kophinou (Gecitkale) and Ayios Theodoros (Bogazici) were attacked by 20.000 men from mainland Greece. This brought Turkey and Greece to the brink of war and Turkey's decisiveness on using its guarantor right led the Greeks to withdraw their troops from the island.

### 3.2 EVALUATION OF THE CRISIS PERIOD

#### 3.2.1 PRE-CRISIS PERIOD: JULY 15- JULY 19 1974

On July 2 1974, Makarios sent to Greek President General Phaidon Gizikis and set free to press a harsh and provocative letter accusing the junta of masterminding the campaign of terror in Cyprus. He wrote;

"Mr. President,

With deep sorrow I am obliged to bring to your attention certain unacceptable incidents and situations in Cyprus for which I consider the Greek Government responsible."

Makarios then started to list certain accusations;

a. the Greek government had sent Grivas to Cyprus to organize EOKA-B,

b. the Greek-officered National Guard supported EOKA-B with men and supplies,

c. the military camps were decorated with anti-government and pro-EOKA posters,

d. the anti-government press in Cyprus was financed and guided by the Greek C.I.A.,

e. the mastermind behind the situation was within the Greek regime itself,

f. the rebellion of the Greek Cypriot bishops was a result of encouragement by the Greek government,

g. the leadership of the National Guard, on instruction from Athens ignored the legitimate demand of the Cyprus government to approve the list of prospective recruits for officer training,

h. the National Guard was an organ of the Cypriot State and should not be arbitrarily controlled by the Athens Government,

i. the only solution to this unacceptable situation was that all of the 650 Greek officers leave Cyprus.

Makarios ended his letter by stressing that he had no intention of disrupting cooperation between the Greek and Cyprus Governments, but at the same time he reminded the Greek Government, as he put it, that, "I am not an appointed provincial governor of Greece but an elected leader of a large part of Hellenism and I demand an analogous treatment by the 'National Center'."

What Makarios was expecting in response to this letter was that the Ioannides regime would give in to his demands. Perhaps, he even hoped to force it out of office, thereby he would not only save his political life but also he would rid the Greeks of a hated tyranny. But the Junta took on the challenge. It ordered the National Guard to seize power and kill Makarios.

On 15 July 1974, the Turkish Foreign Ministry received a note from the Turkish Embassy in Nicosia around 8.30 a.m., informing that; "it has been learnt that a coup d'état has been initiated against Makarios." This was not an expected development and Prime Minister Ecevit was immediately informed about the development. By that time, they got another telegram informing the death of Makarios.

The Turkish Foreign Ministry was already uneasy after the letter sent to Gizikis from Makarios on July 2, 1974. It sensed that there was something going wrong between the junta and Makarios.

In the afternoon of the same day, the EOKA killer Nikos Sampson was installed as 'President' in Makarios's place. The news that Makarios was still alive was confirmed. Sampson was purely 'Enosist'.

The Turkish Council of Ministers met at 19:30 p.m. that day and Prime Minister Ecevit mentioned at his speech that;

Article 4 of the Guarantor Agreement which was designed for the independence of Cyprus must start to run and the new leader Sampson must be overthrown. The Turkish soldiers' existence on the island is necessary. We can only protect Turkey's and Turkish-Cypriots' interests in this way. The preparations for the intervention must start. By this time, we should talk with the other Guarantor State - England, to solve the crisis without fighting. If we are not able to get a satisfactory answer from the other Guarantor State - England - then we will complete all the preparations to intervene in Cyprus.

By the end of this meeting, the Council of Ministers, gave Prime Minister Ecevit "full authority" in this crisis. Prime Minister Ecevit was to try every means to persuade England to side with Turkey both politically and economically, but he knew that England would not accept such a policy. Thus, the Turkish government and the General Staff of the Turkish Army had all agreed that July 20, 1974 - Saturday was exactly the 'Intervention Day'.

The Secretary of United States of America - Kissinger was pursuing a policy of 'wait-and-see'. Kissinger was not referring to Makarios's government but he was waiting for the Sampson government to replace him. Turkish Prime Minister Ecevit perceived this strategy

as; if they lose time, America would recognize the Sampson government.

Turkish Prime Minister Ecevit decided that his strategy would be to go to England to persuade them to join Turkey in a military operation to preserve the independence of Cyprus, using their rights according to the Article 4 of the Guarantor Agreement. This would show his good wishes to solve the crisis peacefully. And he would not mention any word of the plans of the 'Turkish Peace Operation'.

English Government made a notice that they would welcome Turkish Prime Minister, but they did not specify a time. They said that they very well understood Turkey's point of view in the evaluation of the crisis and for that reason they put pressure on Athens.

The same day a ship left from Greece - Piraeus, carrying 650 officials to Cyprus and this would mean a change in the balance of the forces. The English Government was making offers for the withdrawal of the troops of the Junta in Cyprus. So, this would definitely end with the satisfaction of the Turkish Government.

In the light of these developments, Prime Minister Ecevit flew to England without waiting

an invitation. He met English Prime Minister Wilson and English Foreign Minister Callaghan. In this meeting, Turkish Prime Minister Ecevit reminded them of the right of the guarantor states under Article 4 to preserve the independence of Cyprus. He also explained them the need for a Turkish intervention and asked for their participation. However, the English side believed that the crisis could be solved through diplomatic means - through negotiations. English Prime Minister Wilson informed Prime Minister Ecevit that the special representative of the Secretary of State, Kissinger, was requesting a meeting with him. This act was an open signal to express that England did not want to take any position or responsibility in the crisis rather it preferred to be replaced by United States of America.

Prime Minister Ecevit met Kissinger's special representative Sisco at the Turkish Embassy in London. Sisco requested from Prime Minister Ecevit to write down Turkey's demand to end this crisis peacefully on an agreeable basis and he said that he would negotiate these demands by the Athens government.



The Turkish government's demands were as follows;

1- The Turkish troops existence on the island should be accepted for the security of the independence and security of the Turkish-Cypriots.

2- Sampson should be immediately overthrown.

3- The Turkish-Cypriots should be permitted to have a land which has transit to sea.

4- A security system should be established for the arrivals and departures from Cyprus.

Broadly speaking, the Turkish side's demands were aimed to provide equal rights for the two communities living on the island, namely Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots.

Prime Minister Ecevit returned to Turkey on 19 July 1974 and went directly to the General Staff and reconfirmed that the "Peace Operation" would start early next morning. That is, Turkish Prime Minister gave the order for the intervention to the island to preserve peace, security and order in the island. On the other side, this act could reveal a probability of a war between Greece and Turkey. The special representative of Kissinger - Sisco, went to Athens in order to negotiate

Turkish demands, but he was only able to speak to Ioannides who did not believe that Turkey would intervene in Cyprus. The negotiations did not end successfully for Sisco. When he came to Ankara, he said that the Greek government accepted to withdraw the troops attended the coup by the Junta and continued that they might be helpful in the overthrow of Sampson. He also said that elections would be made on the island within one year and nothing would happen to the Turkish-Cypriots on the island.

Turkish Prime Minister Ecevit's response to these answers was very clear. He said that they would take the dead bodies away and bring living ones to the island and this will not be an acceptable and agreeable solution. In response to this, Sisco increased his pressure on Ecevit and broadly said that in case of a Turkish-Greek war, Turkey would be alone.

### 3.2.2 MID-CRISIS PERIOD: JULY 20 - JULY 24, 1974

Early in the morning of 20 July 1974 the 'Peace Operation' started. At 06.10 a.m. Prime Minister Ecevit made an announcement from the

radio to the world. He said the following words;

This is not an invasion, but an act against invasion;

This is not aggression, but an act to end aggression.

We are there to help you, not to hurt.

We are there with love, not hate.

We are there not to fight you but to end your plight.

And the 'Peace Operation' started. At 10:30 a.m. Greek Foreign Minister Kiprios, called the Ambassador of Turkey to Athens, Gurun. The Greek Foreign Minister forwarded the first ultimatum to Turkey:

Immediately stop the invasion and withdraw your soldiers from the island. We permit you till 16.00 p.m. If it is not done, Greece can not be held responsible from the developments.

The Turkish Ambassador to Athens, Gurun gave a very clear and concrete answer immediately. He said that; " It is too late. You should have thought this before. Your offers cannot be met in 2 hours or 2 days."

The 'Peace Operation' was continuing, but there was a surprise to the Turkish troops who landed on the island. They met with a heavy unexpected opposition from the Greek-Cypriots.

The Greek-Cypriots were militarily superior in terms of both quality and quantity.

The United Nations Security Council passed a Resolution (353) so quickly for the first time. The reason of this quickness was, the two superpowers had reached an agreement on the issue; America did not want to have a Turco-Greek war, and Soviet Union did not want to see the expansion of Turkey.

On 24 July a cease-fire was declared.

### 3.2.3 CEASE-FIRE AND GENEVA CONFERENCES: JULY 25-AUGUST 13 1974

The first Geneva Conference was opened, only two days after the return of democratic rule to Greece on 25 July 1974. Turkey, Greece and Britain were represented by their Foreign Ministers Turan Gunes, George Mavros and James Callaghan. America had sent an observer Assistant Secretary of State, William Buffum, to the Conference.

Greek Foreign Minister Mavros announced the next day that unless Turkey agreed to withdraw its forces to the 22 July cease-fire fronts, Greece would abandon the conference. The Turkish Foreign Minister Gunes responded by

indicating that the Greek forces, too, had extended their occupation area and added that "Unless the cease-fire is accepted by everybody in all parts of the island... I can assume no responsibility on behalf of the Turkish Forces in Cyprus."

The negotiations reached an impasse over the issue of the violations of the 22 July cease-fire on 27 July 1974. At this stage Secretary of State Kissinger intervened, talking with Ecevit and Karamanlis by telephone. Within one day Kissinger succeeded in persuading both parties to adopt a new cease-fire line which acknowledged the respective expansions of both Greek and Turkish forces.

Except for its recognition of Resolution 353, Turkey made no compromises in Geneva. The same was not true for Greece. Greek Foreign Minister Mavros opposed some of the Turkish demands but eventually accepted most of them. The Geneva Declarations signed on July 30, 1974 by the Foreign Ministers of Turkey, Greece, and Britain linked Turkey's withdrawal of its forces from Cyprus to the achievement of "a just and lasting solution acceptable to all parties concerned." Britain and Greece thus

lent their recognition to the military presence of Turkey on Cyprus. They also acknowledged that Turkey had a legitimate right to occupy part of the island until such time as a new constitutional order was established.

After the first Geneva Conference, Turkey continued to reinforce its troops on the 7% of Cyprus under its control. The Greek Cypriot National Guard still occupied Turkish enclaves on other parts of the island despite the fact that the Geneva Declaration required their immediate evacuation. The National Guard, still dominated by the mainland Greek officers believed that its control of Turkish enclaves was the only factor holding back the Turkish army from continuing its expansion.

Within a week after the Geneva Declaration, Prime Minister Ecevit began officially suggesting that he desired a territorial federation in Cyprus.

Glaftos Klerides, the new 'President of Cyprus', who replaced Sampson after the latter's resignation on 23 July 1974 stated that he did not believe that "the idea of federation is feasible, on the basis, in any case, of geographically homogenous territories, because this would imply the transfer of tens

of thousands of people..." Instead Klerides argued that a unitary state which granted "local autonomy" to Turkish Cypriots should be established. The reluctance of Greek Cypriots to consider a settlement based on territorial federation led to Turkey to decide to initiate the "Second Peace Operation".

Meanwhile the Ecevit Government had concluded that at the Second Geneva Conference, Turkey should insist on the negotiation of a new Cyprus settlement, preferably a bi-zonal federation. The Government also decided that if the Greeks refused to accept the principle of a federative solution and tried to procrastinate, the Turkish delegation should withdraw from the conference and Turkey should achieve its goal by resuming its offensive in Cyprus.

The chances for a peaceful settlement looked very dim on August 9, 1974 when the Geneva Conference opened. Upon his arrival Turkish Foreign Minister Turan Guner maintained that despite the clear stipulation of the Geneva Declaration, the Greek forces had not yet evacuated the Turkish enclaves. Greek Foreign Minister Mavros, replied that Turkey,

too, violated the Geneva Declaration by extending its zone of occupation by 30 km<sup>2</sup>.

On August 10 1974, the second day of the Conference, Klerides offered the position of vice-presidency to Denktas and a return to the 1960 Constitution. Denktas replied:

For eleven years, the Greeks have tried and did all they could do to destroy the 1960 Constitution....Now we are invited to go back to the 1960 Constitution. This is impossible, that constitution did not save the Turks, did not save Cyprus, has given no protection.

The same day, Denktas submitted the Turkish/Turkish-Cypriot settlement proposal to British Foreign Secretary Callaghan who transmitted it privately to the Greek and Greek Cypriot delegations. The Turkish proposal offered the establishment of a bi-zonal federal state that would provide a great deal of autonomy to the Turkish Cypriots. The Greek Delegations almost immediately rejected the proposal. Both the proposal and its rejection were informal and took place not in plenary sessions but in private meeting rooms.

At this stage Kissinger intervened once more by calling Turkish Prime Minister Ecevit and suggested to him that even though he



understood the Turkish-Cypriots needs for more territory and more autonomy, he believed that these goals should be accomplished through negotiations. During the telephone conversation which took place on August 12, 1974, Kissinger maintained that he felt Klerides would be more willing to accept a cantonal rather than a federal settlement on Cyprus. The same day, Prime Minister Ecevit discussed the offer with the National Security Council and they agreed to offer a cantonal solution to the Greeks, but were unwilling for its ratification.

Meanwhile, Callaghan told Klerides that he was in constant dialogue with Kissinger and that Kissinger had told him that he would not exert any further pressure on Turkey in order to prevent a second operation. Callaghan added that Britain was ready to use its forces in Cyprus to prevent Turkey's expansion and this was favored by both America and United Nations. Callaghan assumed that since Kissinger would not approve a British intervention Klerides would have no alternative but to accept Turkey's thesis for a federation. He concluded that if Klerides did so, then Kissinger and he could put pressure on Turkey to limit the

Turkish Cypriot zone to 20 to 22 percent of Cyprus. Klerides refused this.

On August 13, 1974 the Turkish Delegation decided that it was time to publicly propose its two different plans to Greece. At the plenary session on August 13, 1974, Turkish Foreign Minister Gunes repeated Turkey's proposals and urged Mavros and Klerides to give a final answer. Klerides replied that he could give a definite answer only if he had an additional 48 hours to consider the proposals. Gunes who believed that the Greeks had no intention of accepting a negotiated solution and were only trying to gain time. It seems Klerides thought that time was on their side and if the negotiations lasted long enough, international pressure on Turkey would make it increasingly difficult for Turkey to pursue a policy of 'black-mail'.

The Greek-Cypriots objectives were as follows;

- 1- to gain time since the more time that elapsed the more difficult it would be for Turkey to attack again;

- 2- to mobilize international opinion and try to influence Anglo-American policy towards firm acceptance of the view that since

constitutional legitimacy had been restored hostilities had to end and meaningful negotiations be resumed;

3- try to conduct any negotiations not on the basis of geographical separation but on the lines of integral and bi-communal state.

Klerides was lacking a political base in Cyprus. He knew that if he accepted the federation settlement, neither Sampson's nor Makarios's supporters would stand by him. Hence, Klerides chose to procrastinate on the negotiations with the belief that losing territory in a second peace operation of Turkey would have fewer disadvantages than abandoning the same territory through an agreement. The resumption of Turkey's offensive, he expected, would isolate Turkey internationally and contribute to the Greek cause.

By August 13, 1974 the Turks became convinced that the continuation of the negotiations would bring no favorable results and that the second operation, which from the beginning had been considered an integral part of the Turkish strategy, would be made. The Turks knew that international public opinion was slowly turning against them and that if they were going to do something, they must do

it quickly. The Ecevit government also feared that the Soviet and American stances might change in the long run and Turkish Cypriots could be forced to content themselves with the seven percent of the island that Turkey controlled.

Before giving the start of the second peace operation, Ecevit offered Greek Prime Minister Karamanlis another way out of the deadlock. According to this 'last alternative', Ecevit wanted the Greeks to demilitarize the area around the Turkish forces who occupied 7% of Cyprus territory. After this evacuation, Turkey would extend its control toward Famagusta on the eastern shore, thus seizing 17-18% of the island's territory. This would save 10.000 Turkish-Cypriots in Serdarli, and another 10.000 in Famagusta. Ecevit told Kissinger that if the Greeks accepted this 'interim' solution, he would postpone the negotiations not only for 48 hours but for several weeks.

By the end of the day, Ecevit was convinced that Turkey would not be able to achieve a favorable settlement unless it once again acted "assertively". Ecevit suggested that;

once their prestige had been restored after the fall of the Junta, the Greeks thought that they could take advantage of the hopes concerning the new regime by mobilizing Western opinion against Turkey and establishing closer relations with the socialist countries in order to exert pressure on Turkey.

The Second Geneva Conference took place under very unfortunate circumstances. The Greeks felt so sure of support on the part of international public opinion that they adopted an inflexible attitude. Unfortunately, the British encouraged them. The Turkish government put its proposals on the table including a solution of a multicantonal kind which was against Turkey's own interests and was not very logical because it would have led to friction on the island.

Ecevit was also encouraged to act assertively by Kissinger's reluctance to threaten the Turks in order to prevent the resumption of the offensive. Unlike US. President Lyndon Johnson who tried to intimidate Turkey with a number of undesirable eventualities, Kissinger only reasoned with Ecevit to discourage him. On 13 August Callaghan called Kissinger and told him that the Conference was about to break down.

Kissinger replied: "Let's wait and see!" Kissinger later defended his unwillingness to employ threats and especially the threat of an arms embargo to restrain the Turks by suggesting that;

The United States did not threaten Turkey for stopping military aid for these reasons: First, it was considered that such an action would be ineffective and would not prevent the threatening eventuality; Second, as pointed out in the above statement, we are giving economic and military aid as a reflection of our common interest in the defense of the Eastern Mediterranean. Once such a decision is taken, it will have the most drastic consequences and not just over a period of time covering a few days but over an extended period of time... Short of this embargo threat however, we made the most repeated and urgent representations to Turkey in order to prevent the military action that happened. We have criticized the action, and we believe also that the inflexibility of all the parties in Geneva contributed to it.

Kissinger knew that Ecevit was not like his predecessors. He thought that any threat would accelerate Turkey's second operation. The best way to prevent Turkey's expansion, Kissinger believed, was to continuously assure the Turks that America considered their demands

legitimate and that negotiations would sooner or later bring favorable results.

On August 13, 1974 - one day before the second operation, State Department Spokesman of America, Robert Anderson explained Kissinger's policy, stating;

We recognize the position of the Turkish community on Cyprus requires considerable improvement and protection. We have supported a greater degree of autonomy for them. The parties in Geneva are negotiating on one or more Turkish autonomous area. The avenues of diplomacy have not been exhausted. And therefore the United States would consider a resort to military action unjustified.

Ecevit was encouraged by the Soviets' silence to make the second defensive. The Greek Cypriots were requesting military assistance from the Soviet Union, but the Soviets had refused even to respond. The last Greek Cypriot request came on 9 August 1974, when Klerides told the Soviet observer at the Geneva Conference, Victor Menin, that the Greek Cypriots would welcome Soviet military assistance if Turkey resumed its second offensive. Menin promised to inform his superiors in Moscow, but the Soviets once again did not give any answer to the request.

Moreover, the Greek side was not willing to compromise in the talks. News of genocide in Messaoria electrified the whole situation and so, on 14 August 1974, the second Turkish operation began.(4)

#### 3.2.4.HOT CRISIS: AUGUST 14 1974

After the break of the talks in Genève, the "Second Peace Operation" started. Turkish Prime Minister explained the reasons which necessitated the second operation as follows;

Having reached the conclusion that there is no use but only harm in maintaining the appearance of continuing a conference that is being internationally obstructed and the deliberations of which are unilaterally violated, Turkey has considered it her duty to fulfill by herself her prerogatives and duties as a guarantor power, and her responsibilities concerning the independence of Cyprus as well as the rights and security of the Turkish Cypriot people.



The action now undertaken by Turkey is at least as rightful and legal as the action she started on 20 July as a guarantor power and strictly within the bounds of her authority as such a power, for the same conditions exist today as on the 20th July - conditions that formed the basis of the rightfulness and legality of her action. This new Turkish action is as legitimate as Turkey's initial move and is its logical conclusion. (5)

By 16 August the Turkish forces had captured the northern 36% of the island. Following the cease-fire on 16 August 1974, Turkey invited Greece and the Greek Cypriots to a new conference between the three guarantor powers and the representatives of the Greek and Turkish communities for a discussion on a final settlement of the Cyprus problem. Prime Minister Ecevit reiterated that Turkey would be understanding and flexible on the revision of the demarcation line and would speed up the phased reduction of her forces. However, Greece and the Greek Cypriots rejected the offer. (6)

Perhaps the most significant confirmation justifying Turkey's intervention came from Nicos Sampson himself. In an interview with the Athens newspaper '*Apoyevmatini*' on 15 July

1975, the first anniversary of the coup, he disclosed that he was 'about to declare Enosis' when he was forced to quit the presidency. This illustrates the graveness of the threat to the independence of Cyprus immediately after the coup and the danger of a full-scale war between Turkey and Greece.

Regarding the outcome of the Second Geneva meeting, the Minority Rights Group Report no. 30 of 1976 stated:

Although not participating directly in the talks, the uncompromising spirit of Makarios weighed heavily over the Greek Cypriot delegation. Greece itself was in the throes of political convulsions following the removal of the Junta. There was little coordination, little awareness of Turkey's determination and the unfortunate overconfidence that somehow, unbelievably, the status quo could be restored, mainly with pressure from Britain and the United States.

After the Second Operation important developments occurred in quick succession. The United Nations Secretary General visited the island between 25-26 August 1974 and had consultations with the Greek and Turkish Cypriot sides which resulted in the commencement of bilateral talks in Nicosia between Mr. Rauf Denktash and Mr. Glafcos Clerides. These talks were conducted weekly in the presence of the United Nations Secretary General's Special Representative in Cyprus and dealt with humanitarian issues. The release of Turkish and Greek prisoners of war, which began on 23 September 1974 and was completed by the end of October 1974, was a result of these meetings. (7)

The continuation of the inner lines of the puzzle, described the background of the Cyprus conflict, and how it turned to be a crisis in 1974. Then, it explained the phases in the crisis period, namely; pre-crisis (July 15 - July 19, 1974) period, mid-crisis (July 20 - July 24, 1974) period, cease-fire and Geneva conferences (July 25 - August 13, 1974) period, and hot crisis (August 14, 1974) period. Within these descriptions, the interests and bargaining range, or limits, or offers has been underlined. In the following chapter, the United Nations role as an intermediary party to resolve the 1974 crisis will be described.

## CHAPTER IV. EVALUATION OF THE ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS DURING THE 1974 CYPRUS CRISIS

### 4.1. THE ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS DURING THE 1974 CYPRUS CRISIS

The United Nations plays a crucial role in international peace-making. The UN Security Council has the primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security. It has powers under Chapter V of the Charter, to seek pacific settlement of disputes through investigation and by recommending appropriate procedures to the parties to the conflict. If the parties fail to settle a dispute peacefully themselves, they are obliged to refer it to the Security Council, which may then recommend terms of a settlement.

On the other hand, it is not only the UN Security Council to bring to attention the international disputes to the agenda, but also, UN Secretary General has the power, under Article 99 of the Charter, to bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and

security. Due to his status, and because he is independent of any government, the Secretary General, is in a unique position to be a peacemaker. The Secretary General, usually adopts his mission of good-offices, appointed to him by the UN Security Council, to resolve the conflicts.(1)

The United Nations Secretary-General, Kurt Waldheim, played the role of 'good-offices' mission appointed to him, by the United Nations Security Council, during the 1974 Cyprus crisis. The Secretary-General, carrying the good-offices mission, was there to establish a successful communication channel between the adversaries, in order to facilitate the qualified concessions from each adversary that would bring the crisis to a peaceful and long-lasting solution.

The situation in Cyprus, during the first half of 1974, remained relatively quiet. On 29 May, the Security Council met to consider the situation in Cyprus. The representatives of Cyprus, Greece and Turkey were invited, at their request, to participate in the discussion without the right to vote. At this meeting,

the Security Council adopted the draft resolution No.349. By this resolution, the United Nations Security Council:

1. Urged the parties concerned to act with utmost restraint and to continue and accelerate determined cooperative efforts to achieve the Council's objectives by availing themselves in a constructive manner of the current auspicious climate and opportunities;

2. Extended once more the stationing in Cyprus of the United Nations Peace Keeping Force for a further period ending 15 December 1974, in the expectation that by then sufficient progress towards a final solution would make possible a withdrawal or substantial reduction of the Force. (1)

The uneasiness in Cyprus was continuing since the 1960's. With such resolutions of the United Nations, the organization always stressed its interest in the Cyprus issue, in the means of providing peace on the world. The Cyprus conflict reached its peak with the 1974 crisis. Besides, this was not regarded as a surprise by the United Nations. This expectation of such a crisis to emerge in Cyprus, led the United Nations Mission to pay

importance to the strength and existence of the United Nations Peace Keeping Force in Cyprus.

The meeting on 29 May was also very important as it was the last meeting before the crisis erupted. At this meeting, the United Nations Mission was informed of the parties' preferences to the solution of the problem. These preferences broadly showed that the Greek side was offering a solution based on an independent, sovereign and unitary state. However, the Turkish side definitely perceived this proposal to lead towards Enosis -the annexation of Cyprus to Greece. This was the approach which required the end of the bi-communal structure of the state.

The Turkish side expressed that the Constitution of Cyprus was based on the concept of equality in law of the two communities, and consequently had a federalist spirit. (2) Therefore, the Turkish side was offering a solution based on an independent, sovereign and federative system for Cyprus. (3)

The adversary parties had offered two different solutions to end the conflict in which they put the definition of their interests on the island. The Turkish side's perception of a unitary state was based on

Greece's efforts to reach Enosis. The concept of a unitary state is to mean that the majority would make laws and dictate it. In such a system, nothing would prevent the majority from opting for union with Greece.(4) And, this could never be an acceptable solution to the Turkish side. The Turkish government was trying to establish a balanced system in Cyprus, which would enable the Turks and Greeks to cooperate and prosper under equitable conditions. (5)

On the 15th of July, the United Nations Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim, having received the information of a coup d'état in Cyprus, sent identical messages to the prime ministers of Greece and Turkey expressing his deep concern at the developments on the island, and stressing the importance of the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Cyprus. (6) With this letter, the United Nations Secretary-General formally started to act as the intermediary party between the adversaries. The Secretary-General attempted to establish individual communication links with each of the parties to the conflict. This would ascertain the reasons behind each parties involvement in the conflict.



The Secretary-General was successful in getting acceptance from each party to the conflict as an intermediary. Each of the parties sent messages in reply to his letter stating they agreed that the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Cyprus should be maintained. Although the Greek government's reply could be met with suspicion, the Turkish side was eager to solve this problem through negotiations. That was why, the Prime Minister of Turkey urged the United Nations to adopt certain initial measures immediately to prevent the further deterioration of the balance of forces and the illegal entry of military forces, weapons and ammunition into the island.(7)

On 19 July, the Security Council, being informed of the developments in Cyprus by the Secretary-General, adopted a draft resolution. The Security Council;

1. called on all states to respect the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus;

2. demanded an immediate end to foreign military intervention in Cyprus and requested the withdrawal without delay of the foreign military personnel in excess of those envisaged in international agreements;

3. requested all states to exercise the utmost restraint and to refrain from any action which might further aggravate the situation. (8)

The adaptation of these resolutions did not carry a strong sanction on the Greek Junta. The coup was still continuing. As a result, Turkey, who had performed remarkable restraint and patience in spite of immense internal pressures and humanitarian urge to act during the preceding eleven years, had no alternative but to intervene following the coup of 15 July 1974, and the assumption of Nicos Sampson to the Presidency. (9)

The crisis of 1974 was radically different from the earlier ones, because in 1974 the Cypriot independence and territorial integrity were being actively threatened, and the July 15 coup was a manifestation of such a threat. Turkey correctly regarded the coup as tantamount to de facto Enosis and the Greek involvement as a breach of the sine qua non of the 1960 agreements, namely the prohibition of Enosis (and partition) as embodied in Article III of the Treaty of Guarantee. The coup constituted an 'indirect attack' within the meaning of Article III of the Agreement for Application of the Treaty of Alliance. As

such, it was also a violation of both the Treaties of Alliance and Guarantee. (10) In addition to this, the Greek action could be considered to be in violation of Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter. (11)

Turkey launched its initial military invasion on July 20, 1974. It was acting within its right as a protector of the Cypriot independence and territorial integrity as defined under the Treaties of Guarantee and Alliance. (12) Furthermore, Turkey's right to unilateral action was only permissible under the Treaty's terms in order to establish 'the state of affairs created by the treaty...' to maintain the status quo in Cyprus. This status quo certainly included the continuation and the maintenance of the independence, territorial integrity and security of Cyprus as well as the state of affairs which were created by the basic articles of the constitution. (13)

Following this development, the United Nations Security Council, which had met in emergency session, adopted Resolution No.353 which, inter alia, called upon the three Guarantor Powers, Turkey, Greece, and the United Kingdom, 'to enter into negotiations without delay for the restoration of peace in

the area and constitutional Government in Cyprus' and 'having regard to the International Agreements signed at Nicosia on August 16, 1960.' With this Resolution, the Security Council:

1. Called upon all States to respect the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus;

2. Called upon all parties to the fighting as a first step to cease all firing and asked all States to exercise the utmost restraint and to refrain from any action which might further aggravate the situation;

3. Demanded an immediate end to foreign military intervention in Cyprus that was in contravention of its sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity;

4. Requested the withdrawal without delay from the Republic of Cyprus of foreign military personnel present otherwise than under the authority of international agreements, including those whose withdrawal was requested by the President of the Republic of Cyprus, Archbishop Makarios, on 2 July 1974;

5. Called on Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom to enter into negotiations without delay for the restoration of peace in the area and constitutional government in Cyprus and to keep the Secretary-General informed;

6. Called on all parties to cooperate fully with UNFICYP to enable it to carry out its mandate; and

7. Decided to keep the situation under constant review and asked the Secretary-General to report as appropriate with a view adopting further measures in order to ensure that peaceful conditions were restored as soon as possible.  
(14)

The United Nations Mission, establishing individual communication links between the parties to the conflict, was attempting to re-establish tri-lateral communication links between the parties to the conflict and itself. There, the United Nations Mission agreed that this could only be achieved if a cease-fire between the adversaries was reached. So, this had been the first and major initial step that the United Nations took as an intermediary as to assess sanction on the parties.

However, fighting on the island had intensified the next day. The Secretary-General appealed to all concerned to bring fighting to an immediate end, and begin negotiations for a peaceful settlement in line with the Security Council's resolution of the previous day. Also, the Secretary-General addressed appeals to the prime ministers of

Greece and Turkey, expressing his deep concern at the continued savage fighting, and appealed for an urgent and positive response to the Council's resolution of 20 July. (15)

Resolution 353 was the main instrument that the United Nations Mission had formulated to end the dispute as quick as possible, and had mandated the Secretary-General to ensure a communication channel between the adversaries. The adversaries, Turkey and Greece, said that they agree that without a cease-fire, negotiations could not start, and they would be willing to a cease-fire if the necessary conditions had been reached.

In response to this development, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution No.354. With this Resolution, the Security Council demanded that all parties to the fighting comply immediately with the provision of resolution 353 by which the Council had called for an immediate cessation of all firing in the area, and had requested all states to exercise the utmost restraint and refrain from any action which might further aggravate the situation. (16) On 22 July 1974, both Turkey and Greece announced that they would abide by

the United Nations Security Council Resolution 353, calling for a cease-fire in Cyprus.

The United States Administration facilitated the Turco-Greek agreement to adopt a cease-fire by providing a face-saving formula, ensuring that both parties would announce their adoption of a truce at the same time. The United Nations Administration had played a significant role within the United Nations Mission, being a member of the Security Council. The United States proposed that peace talks should begin as soon as possible after the fighting had ceased on the island. On the other hand, the United Nations Mission knew that it was impossible to cease the fighting all over the island. One of the causes of that was the insufficiency of the UNFICYP. The United Nations Administration played a significant role in convincing Greece and Turkey to come to an agreement to end hostilities. (17)

As mentioned in the previous chapter, during the time of tempting the parties to cease all firing activities on the island, the Greek junta stepped down and turned political power over to a civilian cabinet to be formed under the leadership of Constantine Karamanlis.

In Cyprus, the Sampson junta also fell on 23 July 1974. Glafkos Klerides, the President of the Greek Cypriot House of Representatives, was sworn in the same day as President of the Republic of Cyprus. (18)

The first Geneva Conference began on 25 July 1974, only two days after the return of democratic rule to Greece. Turkey, Greece and Britain were represented by their Foreign Ministers at the Conference.

Geneva Conferences had started only after reaching a partial cease-fire on the island. The Geneva Conferences meant that the United Nations Mission was successful in establishing individual communication links between the parties to the conflict. As a result, this was followed by the attempts of the United Nations Mission to re-establish tri-lateral communication links between the adversaries and itself to facilitate qualified concessions from each party.

Greece's first priority at the conference was to stop Turkey's expansion on Cyprus which continued low scale after the 22 July cease-fire. (19) Greek forces, on the other hand, went on occupying additional Turkish enclaves on other parts of the island. By the end of



July, the "National Guard" occupied 198 Turkish villages containing 35,882 Turkish Cypriots and surrounded an additional 21,157 people in 60 villages. (20) Turkish sectors in larger towns were also raided and thousands of Turkish males were taken hostage. (21)

The Foreign Minister of Greece announced on 26 July 1974 that unless Turkey agreed to withdraw its forces to the 22 July cease-fire boundaries, Greece would abandon the conference. Turkish Foreign Minister responded by indicating that "unless the cease-fire is accepted by everybody in all parts of the island... I can assume no responsibility on behalf of the Turkish forces on Cyprus." (22)

On 27 July 1974, following these developments, the negotiations reached an impasse over the issue of the violations of the 22 July cease-fire. The Security Council met again to consider the situation on the island. The Secretary-General informed the Council that there had been a series of breaches of the cease-fire (23), and that increased their concern about the resumption of fighting again. It was observed that the United Nations Peace Keeping Force in Cyprus was not efficient enough to provide the cease-fire on the island

and that was why the Secretary-General asked the contributing countries to further strengthen the Force. Besides mentioning the insufficiency of the United Nations Peace Keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), he asked at the tripartite talks then under way in Geneva between the Foreign Ministers of Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom to discuss how best UNFICYP could actively assist in limiting further hostilities and cease-fire violations. (24) This was one sign of the reasons behind the failure of the United Nations Mission in 1974.

At this stage, The United States, which was to play an efficient role in the crisis, intervened. The Secretary of State Kissinger called both Ecevit and Karamanlis. Within one day, Kissinger succeeded in persuading both parties to adopt a new cease-fire line, which acknowledged the respective expansions of both Greek and Turkish forces. (25)

Except for its recognition of Resolution 353, Turkey made no compromises in Geneva. The same was not true for Greece. The Greek foreign minister opposed some of the Turkish demands, but eventually accepted most of them.

The Geneva Declaration, signed on 30 July 1974 by the foreign ministers of Greece, Turkey and Britain linked Turkey's withdrawal of its forces from Cyprus to the achievement of "a just and lasting solution acceptable to all parties concerned." (26) The agreement reached, inter alia, that:

1. a security zone should be set up;

2. all Turkish Cypriot enclaves occupied by Greek or Greek Cypriot forces should be immediately evacuated;

3. detained military personnel and civilians should be exchanged or released;

4. negotiations should be carried on to secure the restoration of peace in the area and to re-establish constitutional government in Cyprus.

The three foreign ministers also noted in the Declaration 'the existence in practice in the Republic of Cyprus of two autonomous administrations, that of the Greek Cypriot community and that of the Turkish Cypriot community'. (27) Britain and Greece, thus lent their recognition to the military presence of Turkey on Cyprus. They also acknowledged that Turkey had a legitimate right to occupy part of

the island until such time when a new constitutional order was established.

The Geneva Declaration also bestowed credence on Turkey's argument that the 1960 constitution no longer suited the concept of peaceful coexistence between the two communities by calling for a "just and lasting solution acceptable to all parties concerned." The Declaration did not refer to the "Cypriot State" as much, but to the "representatives of the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot Communities." It also conferred legitimacy on the Turkish Cypriot Administration which had existed on the island since 1964 by noting "the existence in practice in the Republic of Cyprus of two autonomous administrations - that of the Greek Cypriot community and that of the Turkish Cypriot community." (28)

They also agreed that further talks aiming at restoration of peace should begin on 8 August 1974 at Geneva, and that the representatives of the two Cypriot communities should be invited at an early stage to participate in the talks regarding the Constitution.

The Secretary-General expressed the hope that the agreement reached in Geneva on the

cease-fire would be a first step towards the full implementation of the Council's resolution of 20 July. And, he added that to reach this settlement, he was prepared to cooperate fully with the parties.(29) Moreover, in the light of the appropriate action, an amendment was introduced to the operative paragraph of Resolution 353. The amendment stated that the Council was "taking into account that the cease-fire will be the first step in the full implementation of the Security Council resolution 353 (1974)."

When the Security Council met on 1 August, following the developments, it adopted Resolution No.355. According to this resolution, the Security Council recalled some of its previous decisions on the Cyprus question;

1. It noted that all states had declared their respect for the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus.

2. It also requested the Secretary-General to take appropriate action in light of his statement and to present a full report to the Council, taking into account that the cease-fire would be the first step in the full implementation of the Council resolution 353 (1974) of 20 July. (30)

The Secretary-General reported on 9 August that although some progress had been achieved towards bringing peace to Cyprus, the ceasefire was not yet secure in all parts of the island, despite the efforts of the United Nations, of interested governments and of the parties directly concerned. The Second Geneva Conference was held from 9 to 13 August 1974.

During the period between the First and Second Geneva Conferences, the Greek and Greek Cypriot side, far from complying with the agreements reached at the First Geneva Conference, for example, to evacuate the Turkish enclaves and to establish a security zone, continued to attack Turkish Cypriot habitations and to take hundreds of Turkish Cypriots as prisoners. Turkish Cypriots had to evacuate another thirty-three villages and those living in the south were put under an inhuman siege while atrocities were being continued against Turkish villages, where almost whole populations were massacred and wiped out. (31) There was an established emotional hatred as a cause of these atrocities since 1960. The insufficiency of the UNFICYP led to the failure of the United Nations Mission to eliminate this fact. And without

proving the power of the United Nations on the island, it was almost impossible for it to appear effective to the parties to the conflict.

One week before the start of the Second Geneva Conference, Ecevit, as noted at the beginning of the discussion, favored a territorial federation to resolve the problem in Cyprus. However, this was not an acceptable solution to the Greek side. They stated that; "the idea of federation is not feasible. We live on geographically homogenous territories. This would imply the transfer of tens of thousands of people." Instead, they favored a unitary state which granted "local autonomy" to Turkish Cypriots. (32) As will be seen, the reluctance of Greek Cypriots to consider a settlement based on a territorial federation, and the failure of the United Nations Mission to establish a successful bargaining range, led to Turkey's second operation.

The Ecevit government had concluded that at the Second Geneva Conference, Turkey should insist on the negotiation of a new Cyprus settlement, preferably a bi-zonal federation. The government also decided that if the Greeks refused to accept the principle of a federative

solution, and procrastinated the Turkish delegation should withdraw from the conference, and Turkey should achieve its goal by resuming its offensive in Cyprus. (33)

When the conference was resumed on 9 August, the Turkish foreign minister stated that the Greek forces had not yet evacuated the Turkish enclaves. Greek Foreign Minister replied that Turkey, too, violated the Geneva Declaration by extending its zone of occupation by thirty square kilometers. (34)

It is also important to note the confrontational attitude of the Greek foreign minister at the second conference. The Turkish representatives at the first Geneva Conference perceived him as "reserved and undecided", at the second conference they saw him as "uncompromising". (35) Only one day after the first conference, the Greek foreign minister stated that during the upcoming conference in Geneva, Greece and Turkey should "seek a solution to the Cyprus issue acceptable to both communities." (36) On 11 August he reversed himself and argued that "the guarantor powers do not have the right to impose a new constitution on Cyprus." (37)



On the second day of the conference, the positions of the Turkish and Greek delegations were underlined once more. Klerides offered the position of vice-president to Denktash and a return to the 1960 constitution. Denktash replied that;

For eleven years, the Greeks have tried, and did all they could, to destroy the 1960 constitution. Now we are invited to go back to the 1960 constitution. This is impossible; that constitution did not save the Turks, did not save Cyprus, has given us no protection. (38)

On 10 August 1974, the second day of the conference, Rauf Denktash submitted the Turkish-Turkish Cypriot settlement proposal to British Foreign Secretary Callaghan who transmitted it privately to the Greek and Greek Cypriot delegations.(39) The Turkish proposal offered the establishment of a bi-zonal federal state that would provide a great deal of autonomy to the Turkish Cypriots. The Greek delegation almost immediately rejected the proposal. Both the proposal and its rejection were informal, and took place not in plenary sessions, but in private meeting rooms.(40)

Then, the United States intervened once more. Kissinger called Ecevit. He said that

they understood the Turkish Cypriots' need for more territory and for more autonomy. He said that these goals should be accomplished through negotiations. During the telephone conversation which took place on 12 August 1974, Kissinger perceived that Klerides would be more willing to accept a cantonal rather than a federal settlement on Cyprus.(41) However, the cantonal plan was not popular with the Turkish side who believed that the six Turkish cantons around six major Cypriot towns would still leave Turkish Cypriots vulnerable to Greek attacks.(42)

Meanwhile, breaches of the cease-fire was observed and the Security Council met at an emergency session on 14 August 1974, once again. Reports concerning the renewed fighting before and during the Geneva Conferences in Cyprus was forwarded to the Security Council. Based on this development, the Security Council adopted Resolution No. 357;

1. reaffirmed that resolution in all its provisions and called upon the parties to implement them without delay;

2. demanded that all parties to the fighting cease all firing and military actions forthwith;

3. called for the resumption of negotiations without delay for the restoration of peace in the area and constitutional government in Cyprus in accordance with resolution 353 (1974); and

4. decided to remain seized of the situation and on instant call to meet as necessary to consider what more effective measures might be required if the cease-fire was not respected. (43)

At Geneva, it was observed that the negotiations were coming closer to a deadlock. The Turkish representative had presented a proposal, with a deadline for its acceptance, calling for a clearly defined Turkish Cypriot zone covering 34 percent of the island.

This was a signal that the Turkish side was not satisfied with the United Nations Mission to facilitate concessions from each party that was to the benefit of the two sides. As a matter of fact, when the Acting President of Cyprus had asked for an extension of the deadline, it was not accepted. (44)

The Greek side was claiming that the Turkish side did not respect the first cease-fire, and extended its Turkish held territory. They also claimed that Turkey did not have a legal right to intervene in the affairs of

Cyprus, where in fact they used the term 'invade' rather than 'intervene'. They claimed that no sovereign, independent state could accept proposals made at gun point from an outside country.(45)

The Turkish side's reply was very clear. They said that both sides interpreted the Geneva Declaration differently. The concept of autonomy no longer seemed to be accepted. Turkey had asked for 34 percent of Cyprus as a basis for establishing an autonomous administration for the Turkish Cypriots, since they had owned at least that much territory before they had been dispossessed on their land during the past 10 years. The reason for failure in Geneva, however, was the Greek refusal to recognize that the Turkish Cypriots had been and should remain masters of their island to the same degree as the Greeks. However, for the Turkish Cypriots everything was conceivable as long as they participated under conditions of equality and security. (46)

By the end of 13 August 1974, the Turks became convinced that the continuation of the negotiations would bring no favorable results and that the second operation, which from the

beginning had been considered an integral part of the Turkish strategy would be done.(47)

Just before the beginning of the second operation, Kissinger forced Ecevit to offer a 'last-alternative'. Ecevit demanded the demilitarization of the area around the Turkish forces which occupied seven percent of the territory. After this evacuation Turkey would extend its control toward Famagusta on the eastern shore, thus seizing 17 - 18 percent of the island's territory.(48) Ecevit told Kissinger that if the Greeks accepted this "interim" solution, he would postpone the negotiations not only for forty eight hours, but for several weeks. Kissinger, however, failed to persuade the Greeks and Greek Cypriots to accept this suggestion.(49)

On 14 August, the Security Council adopted the draft Resolution No.358 in response to these developments. The Security Council;

1. recalled its earlier 1974 resolutions; and

2. insisted on their full implementation by all parties and on the immediate and strict observance of the cease-fire.  
(50)

The Security Council then adopted the second draft Resolution No.359. With this

Resolution, the Security Council noted with concern that casualties were increasing among the personnel of UNFICYP and recalled that UNFICYP was stationed in Cyprus with the full consent of Cyprus, Greece and Turkey. It also recalled that the Secretary General had been requested by the Council, in its resolution 355(1974) of 1 August, to take appropriate action in light of his statement, in which he had dealt with the role, functions and strength of UNFICYP and related issues. (51)

On 14 August 1974 the second phase of Turkey's Cyprus operation started. It only lasted two more days, ending on 16 August 1974 and captured 36 percent of the island. (52)

The Turkish Prime Minister Ecevit's statements after the second offensive suggest that he believed that Greeks and Greek Cypriots would soon return to the negotiating table in Geneva, and that Turkey would exploit its improved position in Cyprus to achieve a favorable settlement. (53) In fact, a new series of these talks were initiated in 1975 under the auspices of the United Nations Secretary General.

## CHAPTER V. CONCLUSION

The thesis focused on the 1974 Cyprus crisis, in two main chapters. One was to evaluate the crisis according to the "crisis management" literature, and the other was to evaluate the role of the United Nations Secretary General according to the "mediator" literature, within the framework of "Conflict Analysis and Resolution" literature.

The thesis tries to find the answer of the question as to how the UN Secretary General played his role of good-offices mission during the crisis to resolve it. His task in his mission was to re-establish the broken communication between the adversaries and determine their bargaining ranges as to one another. Then, his task should be to provide grounds to put these bargaining issues and the ones which are out of the bargaining range on a negotiation table in order to lead a settlement by negotiation.

In fact, the issues which are kept outside the bargaining range, are the ones to

determine the resolution of the conflict. If these issues, in one way or another, can be put on the negotiation table acceptable to the adversaries, then a peaceful settlement of the conflict might occur. In the Cyprus case, the desire of the Greeks to reach 'enosis' has always been kept outside the bargaining. That is, they never sat on a negotiation table to discuss the real conflicting matters. Resolution of the conflict was simple from their point of view. Their aim was to reach a unitary state, which is independent and sovereign, but only abling the Turks to have "local autonomy".

However, such an expectation is perceived by the Turkish side, to annex Cyprus to Greece, which means 'enosis'. 'Enosis' has never become an acceptable idea to be discussed on a negotiation table from the Turkish point of view. The Turkish side's offer was also very clear. They were asking for a sovereign, independent and federal state. So a federal state would save the rights of all the Turkish Cypriots living on the island, and they would save their 'self-determination' right.



As, it has been read in the previous chapters that the Secretary General did not have the enough leverage to put these terms on the negotiation table to be discussed. Even UNFICYP was not successful to provide peace during cease-fire time. So, this lack of leverage, ended by the Turkish intervention to the island to secure the "self-determination" right of the Turkish Cypriots living on the island; or, UN Secretary General was being aware of the situation, lost his objectiveness and could not act to insist to discuss "self-determination" right and "enosis" on the negotiation tables.

The crisis ended by the end of the "second peace-operation", by establishing Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus on the 36 of the island.

Today, the conflict still continues to be a part of the international agenda. And, still there is no concrete step taken to discuss the terms "enosis" and "self-determination" on the negotiation tables. As these terms can not be discussed openly, no further step to end the conflict could seem probable. However, nowadays, as the question

came to the agenda by the membership of the Greek-Cypriot side to the European Union, it has been started to discuss a resolution based on a bi-communal, bi-zonal federation. In fact, such a solution is not different from what Turkish Prime Minister Ecevit offered in the 1974 Cyprus crisis. So, this shows that, in the past 32 years, the core of the conflict remained the same.

## NOTES

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